Sometimes the right decision is obvious to everyone but the one closest to it.
Roughly 13 months ago, the Toronto Raptors faced something of a crossroads. They had an entire half-season of proof that their current group wasn't good enough to contend. All-Star point guard Fred VanVleet was heading for unrestricted free agency, OG Anunoby and Pascal Siakam had 1.5 seasons left on their deals, and it looked like the highly-respected front office was going to pull the plug and enter a rebuild around promising second-year point guard Scottie Barnes.
VanVleet would have been a highly-desired option on the trade market. OG Anunoby reportedly did receive a number of trade offers. Pascal Siakam was an All-NBA forward with proven championship experience. While the pieces weren't fitting in Toronto, each of them appeared to be valuable on their own and could thrive in new locations. It seemed clear the time was right for a teardown.
That's not at all what they did.
Setting the stage for a Raptors trade
Instead of beginning a rebuild, or at least a retooling, Masai Ujiri surprisingly doubled-down. Rather than sell he became a buyer. The Raptors traded for Jakob Poeltl, a hulking center drafted by the Raptors and sent to the San Antonio Spurs in the Kawhi Leonard deal. Now they were bringing him back, sending out precious draft capital in the process.
A year later, does that trade look like a win? Or has a deal that looked questionable at the time continued to age poorly? Let's dig into the details of the deal and "Re-grade" the trade to see just how badly the Raptors messed things up.
What the trade looks like now
Let's dig into the specifics of the trade and how each individual "asset" has developed in the 13 months since the trade was made. The Raptors were able to use little-used center Khem Birch as the matching salary and they included a trio of draft picks:
The first pick to convey was the Raptors' 2023 second-round pick, which ended up 44th overall based on Toronto's record. The Spurs used that pick on French forward Sidy Cissoko, who has played sparingly for the Spurs but was always going to be a long-term project. Other players available in that range included Jalen Wilson, Trayce Jackson-Davis and GG Jackson II; the latter two may make an All-Rookie Team this season.
Then came Poeltl's new contract. Having a defensive anchor and lob threat unquestionably made the Raptors a better team down the stretch, but he hit free agency at the end of the year and the Raptors faced pressure to bring him back on a lucrative contract or see him walk for nothing (something Fred VanVleet did). The Raptors signed him to a four-year deal that pays him $19.5 million per season, a deal in the range of other centers like Jarrett Allen and Myles Turner.
The centerpiece of the deal for the Spurs was the Raptors' top-6 protected first-round pick. For much of this season it looked like the Raptors were likely to give up a late lottery pick, but as their season has spiraled their lottery standing has improved significantly. It now appears that they will have around a 50/50 chance of keeping their pick vs handing the seventh or eighth pick to the Spurs. If the pick doesn't convey this year it will roll over to a Top-6 protected pick for next season again.
Finally, the Raptors seem likely to be giving a pick in the 35-45 range to the Spurs in 2025 to cap off what is owed to them.
With the players and picks involved in the deal updated with the information gained in the last year, does the trade look better or worse for the Raptors? Let's re-grade the trade.
Regrading the Trade
At the time of the deal, the Raptors looked like they were paying through the nose to take a low-percentage shot at regaining a playoff team. The likelihood that adding a non-shooting big to a team with two shooting-challenged forwards was going to significantly alter their trajectory was always low, and the problem was exacerbated when Fred VanVleet walked in free agency.
It was painfully obvious to everyone but Masai Ujiri and the most ardent Raptors fans that trading for Poeltl was a mistake; it would have been a mistake if they had simply added him for free and then signed him to the contract that they did. Poeltl is a very good, but not elite rim protector, and his ability to defend in space lags behind most of his elite defensive peers. On offense he is a good screen-setter and roll man, but he flubs a lot of finishes around the rim if he can't dunk and doesn't provide any level of spacing.
The type of player is fine in the right role, but he isn't elevating the defense on his own and is probably hurting the offense unless he is operating in a well-spaced environment. Even if everything worked out the way the Raptors hoped they were betting on Poeltl, Pascal Siakam and Scottie Barnes all finding a way to thrive in the same frontcourt. That lack of shooting is a death sentence in the modern NBA.
The massive disaster for Toronto is that they didn't merely add Poeltl for free and then re-sign him to a long-term contract; they also traded three draft picks, one of which is very likely to be a Top-10 pick as early as this season. While they are foolishly trying to "retool" instead of rebuild they could have used every lottery pick they can get, and giving one up will only further hamper their ability to build back a new young core.
There is essentially nothing positive to say about this deal. Poeltl is quite good, and the Raptors are a disaster without him, but they're largely a disaster with him. They overpaid at the time, ignored the obvious team-building steps they needed to take, and lost VanVleet for nothing while committing to Poeltl long-term. This deal was a complete blunder for Toronto.
Grade: D-